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Yet, future requirements must be tempered by the realisation that resources will always be finite, and that there is a limit to the military contribution to operations (short of general war) that Canada and its armed forces can make. Indeed, as stated in the SCP, the size and nature of the Canadian Forces will be such that they will rarely operate independently at the strategic or operational level. Rather, it is at the tactical level that the CF most often will participate internationally. In the case of naval forces, a Tactically Self-Sufficient Unit (TSSU) may vary in composition from a single unit of a particular type of platform to an entire Task Group (TG), the actual composition of which will depend upon the mission requirements. The key factors in this determination will be the ability of the selected TSSU to perform the required mission in an effective manner, without undue assistance from the forces of other countries, and to be clearly identifiable as Canadian.
Accepting the concept of capability-based planning, it follows that naval forces will embody a collection of tactical capabilities that are supported by a wide range of enabling capabilities at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The strict tabular presentation in the matrix, however, gives no clear appreciation of the prioritisation of resources, other than the assignment of H-M-L. Leadmark, as such, is critical to the capability-based planning process, in providing an over-arching framework within which naval force developers can identify those capabilities that are needed to fulfil Canadian naval functions – and, perhaps just as importantly, identify those that are not required.
However, while the co-relation of the CF Capability Areas to the Naval Core Competencies is close, it is not direct. This is due, in part, to two factors. First, the nature of operations at sea does not allow for easy division of capabilities into separate categories of "Conduct", "Mobility", "Protect" and "Sustain". For example, the mobility of a surface task group is directly proportional to the degree of underway sustainment provided by fleet replenishment ships, which may require a high level of self-defence in order to support widely dispersed fleet units. From these other fleet units, in turn, is generated the overall capability of the task group to conduct operations, such as force defence and support to other forces.
Second, because the CF Capability Based Planning process is still undergoing development, it is not yet fully mature. As a result, it was not possible to follow that process rigidly in the development of Leadmark. It is introduced here principally to show that the maritime force development process is firmly linked to the overall CF process. As indicated in Part 2, a follow-on document to Leadmark, the Maritime Commander's Strategic Capability Planning Guidance, will make extensive use of the capability based planning framework in developing the bridge between the conceptual guidance provided here and the short-term targets established in the annual Maritime Command business plans. These follow-on documents will provide the level of detail required by the Maritime and Air staffs (and in particular those in the requirements sections) to implement a rational process for the Horizon 2 (5-15 year) timeframe. This Part of Leadmark, therefore, will serve to translate the Naval Core Competencies into the CF Capability Areas, through the mechanism of competency components, as seen in the following diagram (and as will be discussed below):
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This allows us to return, then, to the issue at hand: what are the capabilities that the Canadian navy will require – and to what level – to fulfil the roles and functions of a medium global force projection navy in 2020?
The fundamental national requirement to ensure sovereignty over Canada's oceanic estate will demand that the navy retain the ability to exercise effective command and control, intelligence gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance beyond the limits of the exclusive economic zone. Exercising effective control of this vast territory will further demand a self-defence capability, as well as a capacity to provide and maintain these forces at a sufficiently credible level of competency to deter interlopers and (or) defeat aggressors. In order for any future effective naval force to meet these basic critical demands, several competency components have been identified. Specifically, they are categorised as:
These general or foundation components of the core naval competencies will be required to establish legitimacy as a "navy". Without any one of these basic competency components, any national sea-going forces would qualify only as a Rank 9 Token Navy, or a Rank 8 Constabulary Force. In the unique case of Canada, given the expanse and challenges of the Canadian maritime security environment, fulfilling all of these basic competency components to the minimum effective level would be sufficient only to result in a Rank 6 Offshore Territorial Defence Navy. However, again given the unique Canadian operating requirements shaping such a force, the resultant navy would have some ability to contribute to overseas international crisis management, but the scope of such contributions would be extremely limited and clearly constitute a token effort.
But successive governments have determined that such token participation in coalition naval operations is not in the best interest of Canada and the place that it has identified for itself in the world. That place consistently has called for a Rank 3 Medium Global Force Projection Navy. To meet those obligations, any future force must be able to fulfil, independently, certain functions in defence of Canadians and in support of Canadian policy overseas. It must also be able to offer capabilities that will add value to the crisis management operations to which it is assigned. If not, Canadian leaders will have little hope of (or entitlement to) participation in the decision-making process, either operationally or politically, regarding the conduct of coalition operations. The competency components that will facilitate the achievement of a meaningful contribution – whether to independent Canadian operations or to those conducted with international alliances or coalitions – are those that will act, in effect, as force multipliers. They add value beyond the cost of their investment to the navy's contribution to joint and combined operations:
In determining the priority given to these competency components, it is acknowledged that Canadians will remain committed to promoting international peace and security. Accepting also that resources will be limited, it is critical that choices be made to ensure the navy delivers the greatest return on investment. The argument that the maximum value for expenditures can be achieved by the adoption of niche force roles is seductive from the standpoint of acquiring capability for potentially limited cost. These tend, however, generally to be support functions. Whatever their operational utility, their political value would not promise sufficient return on a large investment. Besides, an over reliance on delivering support would deny Canada the necessary force structure to unilaterally assert national sovereignty and security claims. Resource efficiency can be achieved more appropriately by building upon those areas in which the navy already has considerable competence and expertise, as will be described in the discussion below.
For the most part, a multi-purpose, combat-capable naval force structure will be achieved through the balanced acquisition of the capabilities identified above. Once all necessary combat capabilities have been achieved, remaining resources could be directed towards capabilities without any war-fighting application. This additional area for consideration, in a category by itself, is:
Finally, it is useful to identify those capabilities that will not be pursued for the Navy After Next. Several of these have been mentioned previously in Leadmark; others are intuitively obvious. They are capabilities either more appropriate to a Major Global Force Projection Navy, or not required for the defence of Canada and that will be brought to expeditionary operations by other allied or coalition partners, or requiring non-conventional weapons that would be against Canadian treaty obligations:
The remainder of this part, then, is given over to a description of each of the naval competency components that have been identified as future requirements of the Navy After Next, and to an explanation of their importance and application. They are offered in groupings of basic competency components and force multiplier competency components, and a review of their defining characteristics will conclude each section.
C4ISR – Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
There is a tremendous synergy to be derived from the fusion of the separate capabilities of the elements of C4ISR and the coincident fusion of doctrine and technology. Success in optimising it will be perhaps the single most important capability that will allow Canadian naval forces to provide viable support to national and multinational objectives. With the clearly established objectives in Strategy 2020 for greater interoperability and modernization, a guiding principle of future force development will be achieving "seamless operational integration at short notice,"3 with our major allies (and the USN, in particular), in these key areas of warfare.
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As key components of the RMA, the integrated battlespace, Network-Centric Warfare (NCW)4 and the ability to participate in Co-operative Engagement Capability (CEC)5 are emerging as essential elements in the conduct of future operations. All serve to reinforce the fundamental importance of the C4ISR competency component. This speaks to the further direction in Strategy 2020, for the Canadian Forces to nurture Canada's unique relationship with the United States by sharing the burden for global sensing and telecommunications. A review of the literature generated by the United States armed forces and other allies makes it clear that the acquisition, integration, and analysis of information and intelligence to generate a comprehensive "picture" of the operating environments of the future is vital. Equally important will be the ability to provide this Common Operating Picture (COP) to all levels of command for use in the decision-making process. Alternatively, not being able to link into and contribute to C4ISR would significantly reduce the utility of any Canadian contribution to multi-national operations.6
A significant national application would be to upgrade the Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP) that the navy presently produces and makes available to various other government departments. The growing array of asymmetrical threats to North America will require the development and distribution of this national Common Operating Picture, along with the existing NORAD system, into a truly comprehensive continental network. Such a COP will require that future C4ISR systems and sensors be multi-dimensional and networked. This will allow for inputs from a variety of air, sea and space-based assets,7 their processing as an integrated data stream for the automated development of a fused picture, and the provision of a transparent and seamless transfer medium to users. Advances in decision-making technology will convert this information data into true "knowledge". As with all C4ISR systems, they must adopt an open architecture design to ensure interoperability with land and air forces (joint), allies (combined) and OGDs. They must also incorporate a potential for growth to ensure that they are not rapidly outdated.
An integral component of this capability will be generating an effective level of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). The increasing sophistication of signature reduction technology and the more difficult littoral-operating environment will increase the challenges of detecting and identifying Targets Of Interest (TOI). Accordingly, future C4ISR systems must be capable of automated detection, localisation, tracking, and targeting to a level that will allow control systems to readily and automatically engage, if so desired by the commander. In situations when more detailed and precise information will be required than can be achieved through intelligence or surveillance abilities, robust and reliable reconnaissance assets and doctrine will be required.8
The vast size of the Canadian area of responsibility in home waters alone will challenge the development of a comprehensive ISR capability.9 Still, although large, the area of interest is constant, and therefore fixed surveillance systems can greatly assist in its monitoring. (All the same, these systems may well be in remote locations and therefore will require a reliable communications link to the end user.) The same general requirements exist for international deployments, where the area of interest will likely be smaller, but rarely as familiar. In this case, while there may be local fixed systems the availability of such systems to Canadian forces cannot be guaranteed. As a result, naval forces will require versatile and easily deployable surveillance and reconnaissance systems. Although technological interoperability with allies theoretically may allow access to their systems, there is no guarantee that it will be granted, or that when granted, it will not be limited or the information "sanitised" to some extent. Therefore, to avoid over-dependence on foreign sources, Canadian naval forces and national command authorities will require integral and independent ISR information to the greatest practicable extent.
For many of the same reasons, a national command, control and communications system with world-wide capabilities will be required. The direction in the SCP, for a High or independent national capability at the military strategic level in this area is especially pertinent for Canadian naval forces, which commonly are deployed on missions around the globe. Whether engaged in joint or combined operations, Canadian naval commanders must be able to advise national and multi-national level commanders regarding Canadian military options, regardless of where they are deployed. Canada cannot rely on allies to perform this task. At the operational and tactical levels as well, this will remain a critical area for maritime forces, given the vast maritime areas of responsibility for surveillance and defence, and the limited number of assets likely to be available for reactive operations.
Given the rapid pace at which situations can develop and the risk that such a pace entails, in particular in a potentially hostile environment, the ability to have real time "connectivity" at all levels of operations will be critical. The timely availability and accuracy of information will allow commanders to plan and act quickly. Therefore, it will be important that naval forces not only have assured access to C4ISR systems, but also that these systems be resistant to interference. In addition, the navy will need to be able to access both military and commercial communication capabilities. It is likely that there will be an increased reliance on space-based assets in fulfilling many of the requirements for C4ISR. Yet, given the need for independent national assessment, evaluation and decision making, the systems so utilised must also possess multi-level security features to avoid compromise.
C4ISR is a central element of naval activity. Across the full spectrum of operations – from peace to war – it is critical to determining the situation, influencing the actions of our forces, and imposing our will on the adversary. It is the primary tool commanders use to cope with the disorder and uncertainty of warfare. It is the means by which commanders synchronise actions in time, space, and purpose to achieve unity of effort within a military force. Effective C4ISR is not a substitute for superior ships, people or systems. It is, however, and will continue to be, the link between these three, and thus the key to exploiting these capabilities at critical times and places, to ensure the success of the Navy After Next in maritime operations.10
| C4ISR Defining Characteristics |
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The need for war-fighting forces to possess a self-defence capability is, to a large extent, self-evident, in that survivability is essential to the safety of personnel and completion of the mission. Although many of the tasks assigned to naval forces may not require such a capability, their probable deployment to areas of tension requires at least an ability to protect themselves in the event hostilities occur.11 The direction in the SCP that Canadian tactically self-sufficient units be prepared for employment in mid-intensity operations means that they will need a level of self-defence commensurate with the risk to which they are likely to be exposed. The essence is that different types of units, employed on various missions, will require differing levels of self-defence. Wherever Canadian naval forces may be deployed, they must be able to defend themselves effectively, while maintaining the capability to conduct operations in order to achieve mission goals.
Regardless of the role and risk involved, a unit's self-defence capability will need to be multi-dimensional in nature. The potential threat to naval units may come from air, surface, subsurface, space, or electromagnetic environments. It may come in the form of attacks by traditional kinetic weapons such as bullets, bombs, missiles, mines and torpedoes. It may also come in the form of non-kinetic methods such as electronic, electro-optical, acoustic, Electro-magnetic Pulse (EMP), information attack, or even in the form of Nuclear, Biological or Chemical (NBC) weapons (sometimes referred to as a variant of Weapons of Mass Destruction, or WMD). To counter these threats, modern and effective defensive measures will be required.
Weapon systems and platforms of a variety of types and capabilities are widely available throughout the world.12 Ranging from relatively old and simple systems to the latest cutting edge technology, their proliferation is unlikely to subside in the future, and the capabilities of these weapons systems will continually improve. Many are compact enough to be fitted on relatively small vessels and aircraft. Others are capable of launch from shore-based sites. The spread of supersonic versions of anti-ship missiles, and the increasing stealth of those and other weapons, will make reaction time for defence even more crucial than it is currently. Also to be considered in the development of self-defence capabilities is the fact that operations in the littorals will expose surface, subsurface and air units to a variety of weapons not normally encountered in an open ocean environment, such as land-based surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile systems, and a wide range of underwater mines.
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With this proliferation of modern technology, many states that previously posed only a limited threat may well possess modern and very capable methods of attacking naval forces. In many instances, high-technology weapons have permitted these military forces to leap forward several generations in weapons capability in the span of a few years. Although few states are likely to be capable of posing a large-scale, traditional blue water threat, operations in the world's littorals will lead naval forces potentially to face a growing number of threats, all far more deadly than generally were perceived during the Cold War. Increasingly, these new capabilities will have to be taken into consideration when planning for, and participating in, operations in support of international security. Moreover, some terrorist and criminal organisations undoubtedly will have the capacity to operate naval platforms. Even when operating in national or North American waters against supposed non-military threats, the dangers posed to personnel and units have increased in recent years. This trend is expected to continue.
Defending against the various threats will require both a multi-dimensial and a layered approach employing a variety of systems optimising detection, "hard kill", "soft kill", and avoidance capabilities.13 No one system will suffice. Moreover, given the projected capabilities of future weapon systems, the self-defence envelope must expand well beyond the 7-10 nm area around each surface platform that is the accepted norm today, if a unit is to have any chance of defending itself successfully. Key to providing a suitable self-defence capability will be an effective and early detection ability. As such, the key characteristics of these self-defence systems will be speed, range and precision. In the case of hard kill weapon systems, the additional characteristic of lethality also will be important.
Although avoiding or defeating the incoming weapon can be effective in many instances, concentration exclusively on this method easily could lead to a unit being subjected to repeated attacks and eventually being overwhelmed. At the very least, it will be distracted from accomplishing its mission. Therefore, the ability to deter – or, if necessary, to engage and defeat – an attacking unit also must be recognised as a vital part of a robust self-defence capability. It also will allow Canadian naval forces the flexibility to apply a level of force appropriate to the situation. This is because, more than simply needed to ensure self-defence, an ability to engage attacking at longer range results, de facto, in a limited offensive capability. Hard kill air defence systems, by their very nature, tend to have the ability also of engaging airborne launch platforms. Effective anti-surface and anti-submarine weapons with a stand-off capability will allow surface and sub-surface units an extra a measure of effectiveness in preventing initial and continuing attacks on themselves. This is fully supported by the SCP, in its call for a "reasonable offensive capability" for TSSUs.14 As such, this flexibility allows naval units not only to defend themselves, but also to take the initiative in asserting and enforcing national or coalition authority, as necessary. Indeed, it is this ability to make use of a "defensive" necessity for "offensive" purposes that enables naval forces to fulfil effectively such functions as MIO, sea denial, or sea control.
Avoiding detection and (or) reducing the ability of hostile weapons systems to achieve a targeting "solution" also are part of a self-defence capability for naval units, and these can be enhanced in a number of ways. The expanded use of stealth design methods and materials in the construction of platforms will be one way; the further adaptation of various emission suppression systems will be another; and the imposition of a rigorous signature control process will be a third. Since the 1950s, Canadian naval vessels have incorporated defensive nuclear, biological and chemical warfare (NBCW) capabilities in their designs. These self-defence features allowed them to operate in a contaminated environment for a limited time without undue risk to naval personnel. Continued adherence to the latest developments in this area of design will remain a valid requirement in light of the increasing number of states and organisations that have, or are likely to gain, access to a WMD capability.
Despite the provision of these various design features, it must be acknowledged that, due to the nature of their employment, maritime air and naval forces may well incur damage from enemy action or the environment. Therefore, "self-defence" must go beyond merely the defence of a platform. It must include also the defence of individuals. Although not often thought of as a self-defence measure, naval units must be provided with advanced methods of containing and minimising any damage they might receive. This will include improved individual protection from NBC hazards, and the necessary training of personnel to utilise effectively these measures. Platforms operating with smaller crews than is currently the norm will require appropriate damage control and fire-fighting systems and precautions.
Greater attention also will have to be paid to the defence of information systems. In addition to traditional physical security measures, and encryption and anti-jamming features, the definition of self-defence must be broadened to incorporate concern regarding the spread of electronic communication methods, integrated networks, and computer systems and the increasing reliance on them. Thus, defensive measures will need to include considerations of such things as anti-virus protection and secure transmission methods.
| Self-Defence Defining Characteristics |
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Force Generation (Resource Acquisition)
The notable characteristics of Canada's maritime geography are its great area, its formidable harshness, and its challenging complexity of undersea features. These characteristics, combined with Canada's world-wide commitments, will continue to dictate the need to acquire naval and maritime air units capable of operating effectively across the gamut of environmental conditions. In order to make optimum use of the technologies and operational concepts that are being developed in response to the Revolution in Military Affairs, and to support the expected high tempo of operations, the navy must continue to improve its acquisition processes and general training.
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A fleet is nothing without the infrastructure and shore establishment to support it. Secure dockyards, competent training schools and professional headquarters planning staffs all are essential elements for the generation of a modern naval force. Reaching the right division of resources between the fleet and its shore establishment will be a fine balance.15 Many states can, and have, acquired modern equipment and raised relatively large forces; however, their inability to match such resource commitments with the necessary high level of training in the operation or maintenance of the equipment, or in the tactical employment of these systems, has resulted in the quick deterioration of any credible capability. In short, "naval technology and weaponry are utterly useless if the techniques of employing them prove wanting."16
With respect to the acquisition of equipment, system commonality must be a fundamental element in any project charter. This goal cannot simply be an individual service consideration; where possible, commonality throughout the CF and with Canada's allies must also be an acquisition driver. The use of common systems will decrease specialised training, decrease inventory, increase the number of trained personnel, and enhance the flexibility of manning within the navy and (in some cases) within the CF as a whole. The equipment acquired in the future must also be technologically versatile. Platforms, systems, hardware and software will need to have growth potential imbedded in them, and new equipment and procedures will need to be adaptable. Wherever possible, open architecture shall be employed in system design and platform construction in a manner that will allow rapid and frequent upgrading in order to maintain effectiveness and currency for as long as possible. Also important will be the need to ensure that adequate stocks of munitions and spare parts will be available when required.
As the cornerstone to Canadian military operations, interoperability must be one of the highest priorities when considering procurement of any new equipment or capability. However, it must not be confused with compatibility. Two pieces of equipment can be interoperable while being quite different in make, look and feel; components from one could not be used to replace components from the other unless they were fully compatible. The adoption of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) equipment standards by NATO and affiliated states will allow the purchase of nationally made equipment that will be both technically and operationally interoperable with the other services and allied states. This will make interoperability less of a technical challenge, but more of a political question covering releasibility issues. Notwithstanding the change towards COTS, it will remain necessary from time to time to buy military or government approved hardware from off-shore sources in order to address an interoperability requirement. Whenever possible, efforts should be made to ensure full support and compatibility with the USN.
In addition to ensuring that an adequate level of initial training will be available for future systems (and their continuing maintenance), the navy must also see to ongoing training. This will include upgrading of skills and knowledge as a result of the latest doctrinal and tactical developments, not only for the employment of systems, but also in the general concepts of modern maritime operations. As part of the development and understanding of modern (and increasingly common) operational doctrine, exchange programmes with allied navies and billets in allied schools (especially staff colleges) will remain important tools, in addition to the maintenance and continued development of domestic military education and training institutions.
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The long-term implications to force planning of the human resource component deserve special attention, particularly in a strategic-level document such as Leadmark. While financial and materiel resources can be defined in terms of how they are acquired, prioritised, allocated and consumed, people cannot, and will no longer be so easily quantified. People are sentient, have free will, and thus make choices. These differences demand that human resources be treated quite differently compared to the financial or materiel elements of force planning. While the acknowledgement that people are any organisation's most important resource has been growing in recent years, it is still seen by many as more of a catch phrase to soothe the labour force than a reflection of reality. By 2020, that attitude will have changed. Human Resource (HR) strategists now predict that Canadian society will have evolved from a point where people are seen as resources to be exploited, to one where people are viewed as investors. Where historically the labour market has been dominated by the buyer (or employer), this is expected to shift towards a labour market dominated by the seller (or employee); in other words, a move towards a market place characterised by employees demanding the best return for the investment of their skills.
This change in the employer/employee relationship, combined with the fact that the pool of persons of a militarily useful age is likely to further shrink,17 means that competition with the civilian workplace for desirable recruits will continue to pose a significant challenge. As part of the solution, future naval units (static and mobile) will need to make use of technology to reduce manning levels. Yet, it is important to note that replacing personnel with technology is generally an expensive proposition; automation is unlikely to prove a cheap answer to recruiting difficulties. At the same time as reducing the number of billets, the navy will need to consider innovative means of attracting the personnel with those critical skills that neither technology nor automation will be able to satisfy.
In this latter regard, the navy will need to become increasingly pro-active and flexible in its recruitment strategy. To address the future "human investor", any 2020 HR policy must be focussed on ensuring employees receive (as a minimum) for their investment of skills all of the following: intrinsic fulfilment; growth opportunities; financial rewards; and service recognition. An HR strategy centred solely on the requirements of the new "human investor", however, is doomed to failure. A successful strategy must also be focussed on providing the organisation with the "right" individuals for the jobs at hand. In the navy of 2020, this will be a work force capable of adapting fully to an increasingly complex and rapidly changing environment; a work force characterised by its ability to process vast amounts of information quickly, and to make informed decisions when faced with a high operational tempo. The "right" individuals will be those with strong systemic awareness, and innovative and decisive characters. The emphasis for our future navy must be on attracting individuals of this quality, rather than simply focussing on the quantity of personnel needed to fulfil vacant billets.
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An important part of meeting the navy's future personnel requirements will rest with the development of the naval reserve. As noted in Part 6, the naval reserve does not exist solely as a basis for mobilisation. Rather, reserve personnel will be required to help sustain the types of national military operations in which the CF may be engaged. Increasingly, the naval reserve will provide those skills not (or minimally) held by the regular force. The contribution of the reserves will be essential to the maintenance of the navy's ability to act in an expeditionary manner, in that reserve personnel and assets are, and will remain, an important feature in the Defence of Canada and North America. Their use in fulfilling roles such as Canadian port security, coastal surveillance, and ensuring access to ports and strategic waterways will increase the flexibility and availability of regular force naval personnel and assets for other operations.
The Force Generation (Resource Acquisition) competency component goes beyond the simple ability to purchase modern military equipment. It is the ability to acquire the right equipment and to recruit the right personnel – those with the appropriate backgrounds to effectively perform all tasks and missions assigned to the navy. It also encompasses the ability to provide the necessary level of training and education to ensure the navy will realise the full potential of both equipment and personnel in service in 2020. Furthermore, it entails the development of the necessary staff expertise to be able to effectively manage and employ the forces so acquired. Only through a tailored approach to the recruitment and retention of personnel, along with the adoption of a rational materiel procurement policy, will the navy develop the flexibility and adaptability necessary to ensure the generation of capable and effective forces.
| Force Generation Defining Characteristics |
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Sustainment (Resource Maintenance)
Once generated, materiel and personnel must be sustained. This entails the ability to repair equipment, to relieve units and to replace personnel. Where the Force Generation competency component must ensure that equipment acquired will be of a sufficiently robust design to allow extended use in operational situations, the Resource Maintenance competency component must see that the continued availability of this equipment over the span of its design life will be sustained. It will be contingent upon the initial acquisition of sufficient support in the form of spare parts and maintainer training, the existence of adequate repair and maintenance facilities, and that these be manned by highly motivated personnel with the necessary technical skillsets.
Indeed, the historical experience of the Canadian navy offers a strong rationale for the maintenance of broad-based levels of national support infrastructure. In the Second World War, the RCN found that the interwar expediency of commissioning British-built destroyers, while assuring interoperability, made it too dependant upon the Royal Navy for wartime replacements and upgrades. Canadian industry had not had the need to develop the infrastructure or the expertise required in this highly technical field and, as a consequence, could not meet the demand until very late in the war. This meant (at the risk of over-simplifying a complex situation) that Canadian escorts were low in priority to receive available modern equipment and the operational effectiveness of the navy suffered. Accordingly, Canada must retain some level of indigenous capacity for the development of leading edge systems technology and ship repair and maintenance techniques. Consequently, it will be important that the facilities and skills necessary for the upgrading and maintenance of major naval units (and their fitted equipment) be nurtured by Canada, either publicly or privately to obviate undue reliance on foreign resources. What is of importance is that this capability be sustained within Canada to support the Navy After Next. Similar requirements must also be met in regards to fuel and other stores to keep units operationally ready.
A resource maintenance capability also demands that there exist an adequate force structure to allow for the rotation of units in operations, or "roulement," in order to carry out maintenance and upgrades without degrading the ability to respond to required taskings. Although a naval task group can in fact be made up of any number or combination of units (depending on the mission requirement), the force structure must be sufficient to support the availability of a nominal task group on each coast in readiness for world-wide deployment. Allowing for improvements, maintenance and necessary training phases, the force structure must, by definition, be considerably larger than the available operational force (see discussion in Part 6, "Influence Events at a Distance").
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The maintenance of personnel resources demands that recruitment targets allow the navy to train personnel without drawing down operational units below required manning levels. Further, an adequate number of personnel must be provided to allow for the rotation of units to ensure timely recuperation and a reasonable quality of life for service personnel and their families. Historically, since 1945, the Canadian navy has had a 50:50 sea-to-shore ratio (ie, 50% of personnel employed in ships, 50% in shore establishments), which has been higher than any other NATO member (the norm is 40:60). This could be taken to mean that Canada's navy has been very efficient. But it also means that "better business practices," which have improved efficiencies by doing away with redundant shore services, work to increase the ratio even further. One consequence is the strain on the quality of life for the sailors, airmen and airwomen who, without the option of shore postings, must spend more time away from their families. (Paradoxically, the old adage holds: sailors join the navy to see the world; what is expected is a reasonable tempo of operations.18) Time in shore establishments between sea postings will continue to be one measure that offers a reasonable operational rotation. The maintenance of morale, and hence effectiveness and willingness to serve, will also require that acceptable levels of medical, dental, spiritual and family support be available to service personnel, regardless of their location.
In addition to innovative methods of attracting personnel, it will be necessary to develop a focussed retention plan so that adequate numbers of specific highly skilled personnel remain in the navy, to ensure ongoing continued excellence and the ability to train newer personnel. It also will be important that sufficient personnel with experience in key leadership positions (not all of which will necessarily be of a technologically skilled level) be retained. As part of its retention plan, the Navy After Next will need to continually challenge its personnel to ensure that their skills and interests are not allowed to stagnate, resulting in reduced effectiveness and low morale.
| Sustainment (Resource Maintenance) Defining Characteristics |
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Operational sustainment allows for the maintenance of forces on station and (or) in theatre. This competency component is directly related to the Canadian Forces capability areas of Mobility and Sustainment, and obviously will facilitate the Strategy 2020 objective of Global Deployability. But at the tactical level, it also will continue to be a basic requirement for sustained national operations, given the vast size of Canadian maritime areas of responsibility. Addressing both the endurance and the tactical mobility of future naval units generally will mean providing some type of underway replenishment capability. For example, it is commonly accepted that current frigates and destroyers can remain on station for eight to ten days, depending upon their speed (higher speeds, as in many vehicles, reduce endurance). With an underway replenishment capability, the same ship(s) can remain on station to the theoretical limits of equipment maintenance and crew stamina.19 Even accepting that future vessels may have a longer endurance than current ones, the principle that underway replenishment can extend time on station remains valid. In order to maintain the same number of naval units on station in the absence of an underway replenishment capability, one or possibly more additional combatants per station would need to be added, depending on the distance to the nearest suitable port facility. Given that warships, due to their inherent complexity, historically have cost significantly more than underway replenishment vessels, a sound economic case can be made for the requirement to provide an at-sea support capability for the Navy After Next.20
Not only can underway replenishment allow units to remain on station substantially longer than otherwise possible, it also facilitates their deployment over great distances without recourse to shore based assets. Without such a capability, the navy generally would be confined to limited operations in or near southern Canadian coastal waters. There would be little or no ability to act in the far reaches of the EEZ, in the Arctic or globally with any meaningful force. While the possibility of making use of underway replenishment resources of other navies exists, and in reality is frequently done when the navy is working in combined exercises and operations, ultimately, responsibility for logistics must remain a national responsibility. In non-alliance operations, an at-sea replenishment capability will likely be a fundamental requirement of participation. Even if this were not the case, a problem would arise when one navy would have to rely on others for sustainment. For example, although NATO has developed a principle of collective responsibility for logistics among member states, there remain specific national requirements such as ammunition resupply and the maintenance and repair of weapon systems. Further, other forces may not give the desired priority to Canadian needs, or provide the level of services considered acceptable to Canadians. There would also be a problem if a strictly national operation required prolonged deployment and no Canadian capability existed. An operational sustainment capability will need to meet several objectives: to supply deployed units with fuel, consumable goods and ammunition replenishment; to act as a logistics co-ordinator; to conduct second-line maintenance of organic air assets; and to provide an appropriate level of medical and dental support.
Sustainment, as encapsulated in a support vessel, will constitute more than simply a basic necessity – then as now, it will be a force multiplier. An underway replenishment capability will allow Canadian naval forces the flexibility to act as a tactically self-sufficient unit, whether engaged in domestic operations far from home port, or deployed outside of Canada in combined operations. It will contribute to coalition forces by reducing (possibly even eliminating) Canadian reliance on others' resources for support, or by contributing a vital and usually scarce resource to multi-national operations. Either way, it will add value to any Canadian contribution to operations.
In addition to an underway replenishment capability, expeditionary deployments may well require the long-term ability to support a large force in theatre. In the absence of a substantial (and in Canada's case, unaffordable) sea-based fleet train, in most instances this will require some form of local support. Even submarines capable of conducting independent patrols of extended duration, will require sustainment and re-supply when operating from forward or overseas locations. This operational level of capability will be achieved in the form of agreements to provide Host Nation Support (HNS) and in the establishment of Forward Logistic Sites (FLS) and (or) Advanced Logistic Support Sites (ALSS). These arrangements and facilities enhance the in-theatre logistic support for deployed forces with the provision of consolidation and re-supply locations. They could also be adapted to provide support to joint or combined forces operating in the region.
| Sustainment (Operational) Defining Characteristics |
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These are aerial assets integral to the task group or TSSU, whether as a continuation of the present concept of embarked helicopters or as a coincident development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Although more a method of contributing to the delivery of capabilities than a competency component in and of itself, organic air plays such a decisive role in so many aspects of naval activity that it deserves specific mention in any discussion of future capability requirements. In particular, organic air will allow naval forces to optimise the capabilities of weapons and sensor systems by its ability to extend substantially the ISR and control capabilities of its host unit or task group.21 An organic air capability is unique in its ability to respond quickly to over-the-horizon threats day or night, in most weather conditions. It will facilitate the rapid investigation of contacts, allowing commanders to conduct Battle Damage Assessment (BDA, to ascertain the need for further engagement), at ranges beyond that which other organic sensors are able to provide accurate information. If armed, it also will permit the prosecution of targets beyond the range of weapon systems fitted to the host unit. Although assets other than organic air may be capable of fulfilling these roles, by definition they would be external to the TSSU, and hence contrary to one of its fundamental tenets. The major advantage offered by an organic air capability will be that it is immediately responsive to the tactical commander and thus not subject to competing requirements of other units or levels of command.
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| Organic Air Defining Characteristics |
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Fulfilling only the above basic competency components will allow the navy to contribute moderately to overall Canadian Forces capability requirements in the 2020 security environment. When the naval forces generated by these capabilities are brought together within the organizational structure of the task group concept, their operational utility will be greater than the sum of the individual components. The net result will be a deployable navy that can protect itself and conduct basic functions to a limited extent.
But Canada's navy must be able to do more than just "show up and defend itself." The navy must be able to support joint and combined forces and OGDs without acting as a drain on their resources. The force multiplier competency components listed below will bring greater synergy to Canada's participation across a wide range of operations, making Canadian naval contributions desirable and worthwhile to allies, coalition partners and OGDs. At the same time, they will play a large role in helping the Navy After Next meet the objectives of Strategy 2020 to 'modernise', to be 'globally deployable' and to be 'interoperable'. These competency components will allow naval forces to influence the actions of potential and actual opponents, whether for deterrence, intimidation or the actual application of force. Accepting that resources are finite and all desired competency components may not be immediately achievable, they are presented in priority, beginning with those capabilities which will bring the greatest return on any investment of resources.
In addition to simply defending oneself, the ability to provide defence for other units, groups, non-combatants or national infrastructure is a feature that makes any committed force or unit of greater value to an operation. Still, the SCP requirement that only a low level of force protection will need to be provided at the strategic and operational levels admits that Canadian forces must be able to operate with allies at those levels of warfare, and should not seek to assume a leadership role. At the tactical level, however, it is accepted that Canadian naval forces will need to have a greater potential to contribute to force defence. At this level, the SCP calls for a medium capability.
This is appropriate, given the self-sufficiency required of Canadian contributions to international operations. In the case of a single unit, the capability of self-defence generally will suffice. However, if the TSSU provided is in the form of a naval task group, then a greater measure of defensive capability will be required. Besides individual units defending themselves, if the task group as a whole is to be able to conduct semi-independent or independent operations, it must be capable of defending both itself and any units under its control. In fact, not only does an ability to defend a force relieve others of the burden, it allows also for the extension of defence to include other combined or joint forces or non-combatants, depending on the force capability involved.
Although it will not be feasible for Canada to play a major role or assume a leadership position in all potential areas of force defence, in some areas this will be quite possible. Currently, Canada possesses reasonable capabilities in Force Air Defence and Force Underwater Warfare (UWW). As indicated earlier, the potential threat in these warfare disciplines is forecasted to continue and may well increase, given the spread of weapons technology and the shift to operations in the littorals. Therefore, it is in these areas that the navy should concentrate its efforts for a force defence capability.
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In most operations where Canadian naval forces could likely encounter a substantial air threat, they likely will be deployed as part of a combined or joint force. In such cases, the ability to provide direction to airborne assets provided by allies or joint forces will be sufficient. Nonetheless, a Canadian task group still will require the independent ability to detect, localise, track and engage multiple threat targets at a sufficient range to protect all the assigned elements of the force, some of which may not be in close proximity. As well, the engagement range must allow sufficient time for reengagement should the initial attempt be unsuccessful. Given the speed, range and increasing sophistication of modern airborne weapons, future defensive systems will need to be sophisticated and agile, capable of automatic evaluation and target recognition (ATR) and response in order to counter attacks in a timely manner. These systems also will have to have growth potential and be designed with open architecture to allow for continual upgrading to meet any future developments in the threat systems. Both control and weapons systems will need to have the characteristics of range, speed and precision, and in the case of weapons, lethality. To achieve this, in addition to a long range weapons system, an effective C4ISR capability that is fully interoperable with major allies will be required to provide and receive the level of information needed to ensure a reasonable and timely force defence capability. The way ahead is perhaps foreshadowed by the American concept of Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC).
With an effective Force Air Defence capability, a Canadian naval task group will be able to provide defence for all vessels that enter into the area encompassed by its weapon systems or those of assets under its control. Depending on its location and the effective range of its weapons, sensors and network interoperability, this capability may be extended to provide Force Air Defence for joint or combined force units. Regardless, if linked into the greater battlespace picture, this capability could provide at least early warning of developing threats and may contribute to operational level protection in addition to the tactical level. A secondary attribute of an effective Force Air Defence capability may well be the ability to contribute to Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD), in the form of sea-based platforms providing indication and warning (I&W) of missile launches, as well as the potential to engage targets. This will be especially important when conducting expeditionary operations with joint and combined forces.
| Force Air Defence Defining Characteristics |
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As in Force Air Defence, the Canadian navy has developed a viable Force ASW capability and expertise. Canada also possesses mature industrial and Research and Development (R&D) sectors in the fields of acoustics, signal processing and ASW equipment in all but ASW weapons. Therefore, continued concentration in this particular area of UWW is a logical method of providing a relevant national contribution to alliance and coalition operations.
The threat from submarines will continue into the future and ASW is difficult at the best of times, given the advantages inherent to hostile submarines. However, conducting ASW in the littoral environment is much more likely and much more difficult than in the open ocean. Essentially, the various geographic factors of the often shallower water inhibit the acoustic environment, making underwater detection very challenging. Operations in the usually restricted waters of the littorals also will likely mean there is less opportunity to avoid potential submarine operating areas than in the open ocean, as well as having a greater potential for interference in the form of additional threat and environmental considerations. As a result, reliance on traditional acoustic methods as the primary detection source will prove inadequate in the littoral environment. Use must be made not only of acoustic technological advances but also of the abilities of other sensors and developing technologies (surface, sub-surface, airborne, land and space based). These various inputs must be exploited and combined to develop a fused Underwater Warfare picture that in turn must be integrated into the overall command and control system to provide the Commander with a complete tactical picture.
Many of the same features that apply to Force Air Defence will also be applicable to Force ASW. The most efficient method of ASW will likely be the destruction of submarines in their homeports. However, this strategic/operational level option would likely only be available in a traditional, high intensity war scenario. It also will be beyond the capabilities affordable or required by the Canadian Forces. Nonetheless, it will be appropriate for the Canadian navy to contribute at the tactical level. Effective management of Force ASW will require an integrated and interoperable C4ISR capability to disseminate a comprehensive battlespace picture that will allow effective reaction to threats, preferably at stand-off ranges such that the threat submarine does not endanger the forces or non-combatants being protected. As such, in this case also a layered defence concept will consist of various long range (fixed or mobile) surveillance and reconnaissance assets, as well as long range localisation and engagement assets. These may include airborne or sub-surface assets, either manned or remotely controlled. Shorter-range assets (aerial, surface, subsurface) with detection, localization and prosecution abilities will form the intermediate layer. The final layer of ASW defence consists of individual unit self-defence, to include an integrated torpedo defence system that encompasses effective detection, localization, and both hard and soft kill capabilities. Finally, although the Canadian Task Group may not be able to provide all of the assets required when conducting Force ASW, it must have the technical ability, experience, and training to exercise effective command and control of assets provided by joint or combined forces, whether they are airborne, surface or subsurface forces.
Another major component of UWW is mine warfare. In the future, mines will be even more plentiful, relatively inexpensive, and easy to use. They will continue to create an underwater hazard out of proportion to the effort required to create that threat. The primary means of dealing with mines is prompt detection, as avoidance is frequently possible, and that will be the preferred method of dealing with mining for naval forces deployed overseas.
Although there is unlikely to be a direct military threat to Canada, the ease of sowing mines requires disproportionate efforts to deal with a perceived or actual threat. This makes the use of such weapons an attractive option for potentially hostile regimes or terrorist organisations wishing to act against Canada, to indirectly threaten the United States, or merely to illustrate an ability to act globally. The ports of Halifax and Vancouver, and the St Lawrence Seaway, for example, are vulnerable points for mining operations against Canada. To be able to deter mining or to provide an appropriate reaction to a successful mining of Canadian waters, a limited but credible degree of MCM ability will be required. Currently, such ability exists.23 It should be preserved and kept up to date in order to deal with the latest potential threats to the defence of Canada.
Traditionally, an effective MCM capability required considerable resources for dedicated ships, equipment and personnel. Modern technology, in particular remote control technology, and improvements to self-protective measures (SPM) will bring about a considerable reduction in the mine/MCM imbalance to the advantage of the navy. Consequently, while the Canadian MCM capability will be limited in numbers, it will be credible and useable in a variety of situations, from a variety of platforms, at short notice. The requirement for a dedicated standing MCM force composed of specialised ships and large numbers of personnel will give way to a limited MCM organization, utilizing modular and portable systems, geared to providing for the defence of Canadian home waters and contributing to the defence of North America.
| Force UWW Defining Characteristics |
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The scope of this competency component is limited to the specific functions of Sealift, Naval Fire Support, and Gateway C4ISR. The provision of any or all of these will serve to fulfil the Strategy 2020 objectives to Modernise, to be Globally Deployable and to Develop Strategic Partnerships. They will allow Canadian naval forces to provide effective support to others in accordance with government direction for national roles or as part of coalition or alliance operations. Importantly, they will ensure that the support provided truly will be value-added, rather than simply providing presence and defensive forces.
The sealift component of strategic lift will be particularly important, in that it allows the transport of heavy and outsized vehicles and equipment such as tanks, self-propelled artillery, armoured personnel carriers, bridge layers and other medium and heavy equipment that are generally not air-transportable. Additionally, sealift tends to be significantly less expensive than strategic airlift.25 Accepting the premise that Canada should and will use military forces overseas, with the exception of the need for quick delivery of relatively small cargo, some sort of sealift can be justified as economically sound. Not only will a sealift ability allow Canadian resources to be delivered to (or extracted from) desired locations, thus partially fulfilling the Strategy 2020 objective of Globally Deployable, but this capability will also enhance some elements of Sustainment.
There are two major characteristics that will be required of an integral or organic CF sealift capability. First, although required at a High or independent Canadian military level, it will remain limited in scope. It must allow the Canadian Forces to be capable of deploying the major elements of the designated Vanguard forces and their equipment world-wide within the required timelines.26 Main Contingency and follow-on forces will continue to need to make use of civilian shipping. Second, although there is no intention to provide a capability for amphibious assault, the Canadian Forces will require sealift with the potential to operate in a theatre with austere infrastructure. Although the majority of embarkation and disembarkation operations can be expected to occur in ports offering adequate loading and unloading facilities, this cannot be guaranteed. There have been, and will likely continue to be, occasions that require the ability to embark or disembark stores, equipment and personnel in regions with rough or non-existent port facilities. Delivery of resources to areas either affected by natural disaster or damaged as a result of armed conflict provide two possible examples.27 Therefore, a sealift asset must also be capable of landing equipment and supplies across open beaches if necessary. This is known as Logistics Over The Shore (LOTS) and is intended for use in a benign environment. In such conditions, Canadian Forces organic sealift must be able to effectively carry out loading or unloading operations in moderately adverse environmental conditions. And having delivered expeditionary Canadian Forces to unimproved areas, there will be the additional concern that many such locations may lack sufficient security. A limited form of local security may be needed to allow for embarkation or disembarkation of supplies, equipment and (or) personnel.
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Development of a dedicated sealift capability within the navy will reduce initial reliance on the availability of commercial hulls, and could be reconfigured or be modified to fulfil a variety of other roles in support of other forces for which combatants are not ideally suited.28 Additionally, national assets would be available for immediate re-tasking or long-term employment without potential complications related to non-government ownership. With an ability to provide sealift resident in the navy, the Canadian Forces will also possess a limited level of intra-theatre mobility, as civilian vessels are not normally expected to operate within an operational theatre in most levels of conflict.
| Sealift Defining Characteristics |
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The term 'naval fire support' is defined as fire provided by naval gun, missile and electronic-warfare systems against targets ashore in support of a unit or units on land.30 This competency component will allow for the protection of forces deploying ashore until they are able to establish sufficient defensive capabilities to protect themselves, or for the preparation of the operating area prior to the insertion of land forces if required. Especially in the event of rapid intervention at an early stage in a contingency operation, naval fire support acting as mobile artillery will allow relatively light land forces to be deployed with some assurance that they will not be placed in an unduly dangerous situation. Naval fire support could also be used to assist in the application of force to resolve a situation, even if there is no immediate intention to introduce other forces to the operation. In fact, it may serve to avoid the need to insert other forces into situations where the potential for casualties exists. The use of sea-based air assets, and submarine- and ship-launched land attack missiles in the Gulf War (1991) and the NATO operations in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999) are three examples of such a use.
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The full range of this capability will be beyond that required or desired by the Canadian Forces. Canada has no intention to act alone or even to take a leadership role in the conduct of strategic or operational strike or in the conduct of amphibious invasions. Therefore, there will be no need to pursue specific strategic and operational level systems.
However, the need will be different at the tactical level. Canada has indicated the intention to participate in multinational operations and will, if necessary, deploy forces on the ground. While there is no intention to conduct a landing of Canadian Forces personnel and equipment in a hostile environment, there will be no guarantee that the permissive environment of an 'administrative landing' will not deteriorate as the threat to forces ashore increases. Circumstances could well arise in which land forces (Canadian or otherwise) will require combat support from forces afloat. If Canadian naval forces are the sole assets immediately available, a capability to provide some form of tactical level naval fire support (whether aerial munitions, land attack missiles or gunfire) to forces ashore will be necessary.31
There are any number of other applications of a naval fire support capability in future littoral operations. It will provide the protection necessary to conduct a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) in a potentially hostile environment, which is a clearly stated national responsibility. Similarly, it could contribute to both force and self-defence of naval units, in providing the ability to engage shore targets such as anti-ship or anti-air batteries. It also would contribute to the provision of a "reasonable offensive capability" for a limited form of interdiction against land targets (such as shore bombardment and 'trainbusting' during the Korean War – see Part 4). In each of these cases, it is considered that a medium level capability will be required to allow Canadian naval forces to take a leadership role at the tactical level of naval fire support for operations ashore.32
The acquisition of this capability not only would contribute to the defensive and offensive abilities of Canadian naval forces, but also would reduce reliance on allies such as the United States or Great Britain for the provision of this resource at the tactical level in combined operations. At the same time, it would serve to generate an advanced combat capability involving leading edge technology. Important features of this competency component will be range, speed, precision and lethality, as related to the actual weapons system. This component also will be contingent upon the possession of a leading edge C4ISR capability. It would enhance combat preparedness and increase the flexibility of potential employment within joint and combined forces, and thus the interoperability of Canadian naval forces. All of these attributes clearly support several of the objectives articulated in Strategy 2020.
| Naval Fire Support Defining Characteristics |
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The development of this competency component likely would require leading edge software. Such software not only would be able to interface effectively between the different levels of technical complexity, but also would have to have an effective filtering system to ensure that less sophisticated systems were not overwhelmed with the amount and types of data provided. Additionally, robust security measures, such as multi-level access would be required in order to satisfy the concerns of the more advanced states who would be providing much of the ISR to develop the picture. Although difficult to develop and keep current, given the multinational nature of Canadian force participation, this capability would prove to be extremely useful, particularly in coalition operations.
| Gateway C4ISR Defining Characteristics |
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Tailored Capabilities for OOTW
The Spectrum of Conflict diagram in Figure 1 provides a graphic illustration of the fact that the portion considered Operations Other Than War (OOTW) is greater than the portion pertaining to operations of war or "war-fighting." This is perhaps not surprising. The Canadian definition states that OOTW "are very broad in scope and range from domestic operations within Canada to peace-enforcement operations abroad."33 Even if the use of any form of combat operation is included as war-fighting, a significant part of what armed forces do remains outside that realm. Navies are no different. A review of the potential naval functions (Figure 6) affirms that many fall into non-war-fighting categories.
Tailored capabilities are those that are specifically and solely geared towards the conduct of OOTW. One example would be the commitment of specific financial resources to the design of a warship to compensate for providing it with an ice-breaking capability, and then the additional associated Operations and Maintenance costs. Another would be the acquisition of equipment and training specifically for the purpose of providing assistance in environmental or natural disasters.
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Yet, many of the competency components listed in this part would allow the Navy After Next to conduct OOTW despite their acquisition primarily for war-fighting purposes. In fact, several of the navy's functions that are currently defined as OOTW rely heavily on the capabilities that are developed for the purpose of allowing it to engage in combat operations. For example, naval diplomacy and MIO are both considered OOTW. Yet, to be effective, both rely on the inherent capability of the forces involved in these operations to apply armed force if required.
The ability to conduct a wide range of OOTW will allow for a meaningful contribution to national and international situations, and will enhance the relevance of the navy both domestically and internationally. Indeed, working with OGDs or NGOs will serve to further develop and strengthen strategic partnerships with these agencies in accordance with the objectives of Strategy 2020. Even without tailored capabilities for OOTW, naval forces still will be able to conduct a significant level of these types of operations due to their inherent flexibility. It bears repeating that, while military and naval forces trained and equipped for combat tasks can be employed for non-combat roles, the reverse will certainly not be the case. As the ultimate reason for naval forces is to be prepared to conduct combat operations in support of the national will, the acquisition of capabilities tailored for OOTW (specific equipment, training, skills and doctrine) should only be contemplated once all necessary military capabilities have been adequately provided.
| Tailored Capabilities for OOTW |
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This Part of Leadmark
has been developed from the core competencies
needed to fulfil the potential Canadian naval functions identified in
Part 6. In doing so, a number of naval competency components have been
described, and these can be related directly to the objectives of the
1994 Defence White Paper,
Strategy 2020 and the CF Capability
Goals matrix. Without the articulated basic
competency components, the Navy After Next will be little more
than a "paper tiger", unable to realise its core competencies at even
the most rudimentary level. Other force multiplier
competency components are required to enable the Navy After Next
to be a significant player on behalf of Canada in joint and combined operations
at home or abroad. When these are provided at the levels stated in the
Capability Goals Matrix (Figure 7), and brought together within the catalytic
structure of the task group, the value of the Navy After Next is assured.
Strategy 2020 and the SCP
demand that such proficiency be achieved by "high quality, combat capable,
interoperable and task tailored forces." Where Navy After Next capabilities
are concerned, the leadmark to which naval planners must steer is clear.
1 These definitions are modifications of those found in the Long Term Capital Plan (Equipment) – Draft 3 (Ottawa: DND, June 2000). They continue to be under development; these were prepared in cooperation with the Directorate of Defence Analysis (DDA) and have been adopted for interim use in Leadmark.
2 The Capability Goal Matrix construct is still under development. This table portrays the state of the Matrix at the time of Leadmark's publication. The process undoubtedly will undergo further revision.
3 Strategy 2020, p. 10.
4 Network-Centric Warfare derives its power from the networking of a well-informed but geographically dispersed force. The enabling elements are: a high-performance information grid; access to all appropriate information sources; weapons reach and manoeuvre with precision and speed of response; value-adding C2 processes (to include high-speed automated assignment of resources to need); and integrated sensor grids closely coupled to shooters and the C2 process. See Arthur K. Cebrowski VAdm (USN) and John J. Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," in United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 124:1 (January, 1998), pp. 28-35.
5 This concept envisions the combination of a high-quality sensor grid with a high-performance engagement grid. The sensor grid fuses data from multiple sensors on a variety of units to develop a composite track with engagement quality. This means that units that themselves may not have generated fire control solutions, detected the intended target, or are subject to jamming can be made aware of and engage a target. CEC is also envisaged as allowing the commander to have centralized operational control of all connected weapon systems, with the goal being that CEC will also have the ability to conduct engagements in an automated mode. See David S. Albert et al, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority (Washington D.C.: DoD C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, 2nd ed. 2000), pp. 170-72; Cebrowski and Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future.".
6 For example, although the Canadian navy's contribution to the Gulf War consisted of three relatively inappropriately equipped ships, the Canadian TG commander was the only non-American Warfare Commander. This was largely a result of the compatibility and interoperability of the C4ISR capabilities of the Canadian ships with both the American and major coalition naval forces in the theatre. See Morin and Gimblett, Operation Friction, pp. 182, and 193-97; Miller and Hobson, The Persian Excursion, pp. 113-120.
7 Intelligence resources will include signals intelligence (sigint), imagery support, undersea surveillance systems, environmental information (oceanographic and meteorological) systems, tactical deployed systems, and information provided by joint forces, allies, OGDs and commercial sources.
8 In the past, surveillance and reconnaissance assets often were separate platforms. Surveillance assets tended to be used to cover a large area and provide general information with regards to activities within the area, such as the presence of contacts. Reconnaissance (generally carried out by a separate platform) was often required to positively identify targets of interest and to provide greater detail on activities or to conduct tracking or targeting. The distinction is lessening with the projected capabilities of some assets (such as satellites or Long Range Patrol Aircraft) to provide either general wide-area information or detailed information of great resolution. In future, the difference between surveillance and reconnaissance will be more the doctrinal issue of when and how the asset is employed to fulfil a particular role, rather than the operational decision of which asset to use.
9 Canada has the world's longest coastline and currently claims political sovereignty and economic jurisdiction over more than 6 million square kilometres of ocean in the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic (Adjusting Course, p. 12n [which refers to Herbert, Canada's Oceans Dimensions]). The navy is largely responsible for the surveillance of this area and the development of a Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP) that is shared with other government departments.
10 Adapted from The Canadian Navy's Command And Control Blueprint To 2020 (Draft) (Ottawa: Directorate of Maritime Project and Policies Development, July 2000), p. 3.
11 For example, although not engaged in hostilities, NATO naval forces enforcing the sanctions against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1993 were concerned that, should they enter Montenegrin territorial waters, they would have to be wary of mobile coastal missile sites, coastal artillery, missile-fitted frigates and fast patrol boats, conventional submarines, a variety of aircraft and an extended mining capability. See Commodore G.R. Maddison, "Operations in the Adriatic," in Peter Haydon and Ann Griffiths (eds), Multinational Naval Forces (Halifax NS: Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1996), p. 200.
12 See United States, Challenges to Naval Expeditionary Warfare (Office of Naval Intelligence, March 1997). For example, this publication states that more than 75 countries possess over 90 types of anti-ship cruise missiles, some 60 countries have torpedoes in inventory comprising over 60 types, while in excess of 150 types of mines are held in the stocks of over 50 states. There are also a variety of land based systems to be considered by naval forces operating in the vicinity of land.
13 Hard kill systems are those that physically destroy the attacking weapon. Soft kill systems are those that seek to defeat the attacking weapon by diverting it from the intended target through the use of deception, seduction or confusion methods.
14 SCP, p. 19.
15 In the two world wars, Canada's navy suffered each extreme of the scale. In the First World War, an efficient staff was built up, but without the ships to be employed effectively. In the Second World War, an over-stretched Naval Service Headquarters had trouble keeping pace with the navy's rapid expansion. Recent experience is more promising. In the summer of 1990, although the Canadian navy had only older ships to despatch to the Persian Gulf, their preparation for the deployment was contingent upon the existence, first of staff officers to identify the requirements for upgrading, second of the availability of modern systems from the Canadian Patrol Frigates then-building, and finally of the dockyard facilities to fit them.
16 Clark G. Reynolds, Command of the Sea: the History and Strategy of Maritime Empires, Vol. 1 (Malabar: Robert E. Krieger, 1983), p. 10.
17 Capt(N) A. Okros , "Into the 21st Century: Strategic HR Issues" (lecture given to Army Council, 7-8 January 1999).
18 See Capt(N) Kevin Laing, "Canada's Navy: Operational Tempo at the Millennium" (paper presented to "The Canadian Navy in the Post Cold War Era", a conference held at the University of Calgary, March 2001, proceedings publication pending).
19 Adjusting Course, p. 13; LCdr Bruce Irvine, "Afloat Logistics and Sealift Capability for the Canadian Navy," Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol 117, No. 4 (Summer, 1997), p. 14. While the same principle can be extended to air-to-air refuelling, both aircraft and aircrew limits are more finite.
20 For example, Halifax class frigates exceeded an all-inclusive unitary cost of $754 million. See Daniel Sing, "Procuring Warships for the Navy: Does Canada Spend Its Money Wisely?," Canadian Forces College Review, (1995), p. 80. Estimates place the cost of the Royal Netherlands Navy AOR replacement project at $328M. Even the ALSC (a hybrid vessel to include replenishment along with additional other capabilities) has a projected Unit Capital Cost of $410 million (NDHQ/VCDS, "DDA Brief of the Strategic Lift Concept Study to PJBD," 26 October 2000).
21 In the surface surveillance role, ship-borne helicopters, (the current organic air asset), equipped with a modern radar can cover more than 25 times the area capable of being searched by a ship alone. See the Maritime Helicopter Project Statement of Operational Requirements at http://www.dnd.ca/admmat/mhp/docssor_e.html
22 This argument is made by, among others, Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers, pp. 171-74.
23 Modern remote control technology is being exploited to provide remote minehunting, mine disposal and influence minesweeping techniques. A remote minehunting technology demonstrator is currently undergoing trials and is showing great promise.
24 The 1994 White Paper (chapter 6, p. 7) requires the CF to be ". . . prepared to deploy on UN operations contingency forces up to a maritime task group, a brigade group plus an infantry battalion group, a wing of fighter aircraft, and a squadron of tactical transport aircraft." ; Strategy 2020 (p. 10) calls for the CF to "enhance the combat preparedness, global deployability and sustainability of our maritime, land and air forces.", and to "Enhance our strategic airlift and sealift capability."
25 A comparison of cost in 1998 indicated that the approximate cost of movement of a ton of cargo by sea was $0.04 per ton/mile. For the same cargo to go by military aircraft the costs would have been: CC130 – $3.08, CC150 – $0.64 and by C17 Globemaster – $0.41 per ton/mile. DND, Directorate of Defence Analysis, Strategic Lift Analysis and the Strategic Lift Concept Study briefing 3 June 1998.
26 The current requirement is stated as the land force "vanguard and main contingence forces are to be fully deployable to an offshore theatre of operations within 21 and 90 days respectively." See Strategy 2020, p. 10; 1994 White Paper, p. 39.
27 The situation in Somalia during Operation Deliverance in 1992 is a useful example. See Capt (N) R.W. Allen, "Combined and Joint Operations in Somalia," in Haydon and Griffiths (eds.) Multinational Naval Forces (Halifax NS: Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1996), pp. 203-30.
28 Such as the provision of C2, R&R and medical support facilities for Joint Forces in an environment where insufficient facilities exist ashore or are not deployed, as occurred with the use of the AOR ships deployed to Somalia and East Timor.
29 See Richard Scott, "Learning the maritime lessons of East Timor," in Jane's Defence Weekly, vol. 34, no. 09, (30 August 2000), pp. 27-30.
30 It is also known in USN jargon as "naval fires". For a further discussion, see "Naval Fires: Sea-Based Warfighting in the 21st Century" in Surface Warfare, vol. 23, no. 5 (September/October 1998), pp. 18-23.
31 The tactical level of naval fire support is characterised by the ability to react within minutes against forces immediately threatening friendly forces at the tactical level. See "Naval Fires: Sea-Based Warfighting in the 21st Century," p. 20.
32 As noted in the section on Force Defence, this medium level capability would require, if not the ability to deliver all aspects of the capability by CF units, at least the ability to execute effective command and control of any appropriately equipped forces made available to Canadian commanders.
33 Canada, Defence Planning Guidance 2001 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2000), p. GL-6.
| Published: 2002 08 06 |  |
